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Thoughts on Bakke and Its Effect on
Race-Conscious Decision-Making
Michael E. Rosman'
This article focuses on race-conscious decision-making
("RCDM") in admissions processes in higher education.1 RCDM
has become increasingly controversial in recent years, so much so
that the citizens of our most populous state outlawed it. 2 This ar-
ticle explores the phenomenon of RCDM's increasing unpopular-
ity in university admissions, and suggests that part of the reason
for that unpopularity is Justice Powell's diversity rationale in
Regents of the University of California v Bakke.3
The original rationale for RCDM in all walks of society was
straightforward. As President Johnson put it in his famous
speech at Howard University:
You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled
by chains and liberate him, bring him up to a starting line
of a race and then say, "you are free to compete with all
t General Counsel, The Center for Individual Rights (CIR), Washington, D.C.; J.D.,
1984, Yale Law School; B.A., 1981, University of Rochester. I would like to thank Mark
Nadel and Arthur Spitzer for their comments. The views expressed here, however, are my
own. They are not necessarily CIR's and they are not necessarily any of CIR's co-counsel
or clients.
1 In this article, and as a general rule, I try to avoid using the phrase "affirmative
action" because its definition is so elastic. See Lungren v Superior Court, 55 Cal Rptr 2d
690, 694 (App 1996) ("The term 'affirmative action' ... is rarely defined ... so as to form
a common base for intelligent discourse."), quoting Dawn v State Personnel Board, 154 Cal
Rptr 186, 190 (App 1979) (Paras concurring). See also Minnick v California Department of
Corrections, 452 US 105, 128 (1981) (Stewart dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("[Under
the Equal Protection Clause,] a sovereign State may never [engage in racial discrimina-
tion], [aind it is wholly irrelevant whether ... the discrimination is called 'affirmative
action' or by some less euphemistic term.") Although I have occasionally (in my role as a
litigator challenging such programs) used the phrase "reverse discrimination," the word
"discrimination" frequently (perhaps unfairly) has pejorative connotations. Accordingly, I
will use "race-conscious decision-making" in this piece.
2 Cal Const Art I, § 31 (codifying Proposition 209). See also Washington Civil Rights
Act, Rev Code Wash § 49.60.400 (2002) (codification of Initiative Measure No 200).
3 438 US 265, 312-15 (1978).
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the others," and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair.4
In other words, the long, sordid history of state-sponsored
discrimination and the legal impediments imposed against Afri-
can Americans in this country justified providing some extra con-
sideration to African-American candidates for various positions.
What happened to this justification? It has been essentially
abandoned. The primary argument in support of RCDM, at least
in higher education, is no longer Johnson's race running meta-
phor, but the ever present, ill-defined "diversity." Bakke is the
cause of this phenomenon. Bakke also, I believe, is one of the
causes of the increasing unpopularity of RCDM.
After reporting the survey results showing the increasing un-
popularity of RCDM and suggesting possible explanations (Part
I), this essay discusses Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, its use
of the terms "academic freedom" and "diversity," and the various
well-known (and not so well-known) problems that opinion has
(Parts II and III). I then employ the small amount of comparative
advantage I have in this area, and describe how the inherent
problems in Justice Powell's opinion have affected and skewed
4 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: To
Fulfill These Rights (June 4, 1965), available online at <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/
johnsonlarchives.hom/speeches.hom650604.asp> (visited Oct 7, 2002) [on file with U Chi
Legal Fl. See also Gabriel J. Chin, ed, 1 Affirmative Action and the Constitution: Affirma-
tive Action Before Constitutional Law 1964-1977 21-26 (1998), quoted in Kenneth Jost,
Affirmative Action, 11 Cong Q 739, 745 (Sept 21, 2001).6 In Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v FCC, 141 F3d 344 (DC Cir 1998), the FCC
justified licensing requirements for RCDM in radio station employment as promoting
"diversity." The D.C. Circuit felt that this showed
how much burden the term 'diversity' has been asked to bear in the latter
part of the 20th century in the United States. It appears to have been
coined both as a permanent justification for policies seeking racial pro-
portionality in all walks of life ('affirmative action' has only a temporary
remedial connotation) and as a synonym for proportional representation
itself.
Id at 356. See also Alan M. Dershowitz and Laura Hanft, Affirmative Action And The
Harvard College Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm Or Pretext, 1 Cardozo L Rev 379,
404 (1979) ('The concept of 'diversity' is so vague that it lends itself to a myriad of widely
divergent and ever-changing definitions capable of masking the criteria actually at work");
Samuel Issacharoff, Bakke In the Admissions Office and the Courts: Can Affirmative Ac-
tion Be Defended?, 59 Ohio St L J 669, 677-78 (1998) (noting that "one of the clear legacies
of Bakke has been to enshrine the term 'diversity' within the legal lexicon to cover every-
thing from curricular enrichments to thinly-veiled set-asides"); id at 678 ("The problem
with diversity as a justification for a challenged affirmative action program is that it is an
almost incoherent concept to operationalize, unless diversity means a predetermined
number of admittees from a desired group.").
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the defenses of RCDM and the litigation involving admissions
programs that use RCDM (Part IV). I close (in Part V) with a
brief thought or two about the overall problem that Justice Pow-
ell created for RCDM in higher education.
I. FALTERING SUPPORT FOR RCDM
RCDM has become increasingly unpopular. A poll published
during the summer of 2001, conducted by the Washington Post,
the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University,
asked the following question to 1,709 adults (with an oversam-
pling of minority groups), and reported the following results:6
In order to give minorities more opportunity, do you be-
lieve race or ethnicity should be a factor when deciding
who is hired, promoted, or admitted to college, or that hir-
ing, promotions, and college admissions should be based
strictly on merit and qualifications other than race or eth-
nicity?
Race or ethnicity Should be based Don't know
should be a factor strictly on merit
and qualifications
other than race/
ethnicity
Total 5% 92% 3%
White 3% 94% 3%
African American 12% 86% 2%
Hispanic 7% 88% 4%
Asian 7% 84% 9%
Indeed, only a modest majority (55%) of respondents favored hav-
ing employers or colleges make an extra effort to find and recruit
qualified minorities,7 and an overwhelming majority (86%) op-
6 See Washington Post/Kaiser/Harvard Racial Attitudes Survey, Question 50, avail-
able online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/sidebars/polls/race07ll01.
htm> ("Post Survey Web Site") (visited Oct 17, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. See also
The Center for Individual Rights, No Retreat: The Alamo of Affirmative Action, available
online at <http//www.cir-usa.org/recent-cases/michigan.html> (visited Oct 17, 2002) [on
file with U Chi Legal F]. Additional breakdowns from the poll data can be obtained on the
first web site through interactive processes. Some of the data on the second web site were
obtained in this way. Conversation with Curt Levey of the Center for Individual Rights
(Aug 9, 2002).
7 Post Survey Web Site, Question 51 (cited in note 6). The racial breakdown in re-
sponding to this question was somewhat starker than the question concerning whether
race should be a factor. 49 percent of whites, 77 percent of African Americans, 62 percent
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posed using race as a factor when drawing boundaries for U.S.
congressional voting districts. 8
The Post did not find these survey results surprising, and
focused its attention on white failure to understand African-
American circumstances. Thus, the title of its article about the
survey was not "Race Preferences Overwhelmingly Unpopular
Among All Races," but rather "Misperceptions Cloud Whites'
View of Blacks."9 Indeed, it barely reported RCDM's widespread
unpopularity, saying only (towards the end of the article) that "an
overwhelming majority of all whites and blacks continue to reject
giving outright preferences to blacks and other minorities in em-
ployment or admissions to college.""° According to the Post, "'hard'
preference programs are vanishing fast from the scene, either
ended by judges who ruled these programs constituted reverse
discrimination or abandoned by their besieged sponsors.""
Of course, this is nonsense. "Hard" preferences of the kind
identified by the survey question, where race or ethnicity is a
"factor," are quite prevalent, especially in higher education."
of Hispanics, and 63 percent of Asians supported making an "extra effort" to recruit. There
may have been some confusion over the wording of this question. In a related article, the
Post quoted an individual who it said purportedly opposed outreach programs, but who
said: "If they want to recruit minorities, fine, as long as an equally qualified white isn't
replaced. If that's a problem, make the school bigger." See Richard Morin, Misperceptions
Cloud Whites' View of Blacks, Wash Post Al (Jul 11, 2001).
8 Post Survey Web Site, Question 52b (cited in note 6). Significant majorities of every
racial/ethnic category opposed using race for this purpose: 90 percent of whites, 70 percent
of African Americans, 83 percent of Hispanics, and 78 percent of Asians.
9 Morin, Misperceptions Cloud Whites' View of Blacks, Wash Post at Al (cited in note
7). The primary focus of the article reporting the poll results was that whites who were
informed about the condition of racial and ethnic minorities were more likely to support
an obligation upon government to insure that African Americans and other minorities
were treated equally and fairly in public schools, by the police, etc. Id ("Misinformed
whites were far less likely to view black problems as being serious, or to favor government
action to correct persistent social and economic disparities.").
10 Id. The author did not provide exact numbers for African Americans, said nothing
at all about the responses of the other minority groups surveyed, and reported only that
there was little difference between informed and uninformed whites. Id.
Morin, Misperceptions, Wash Post at Al (cited in note 7).
See Jost, Affirmative Action at 748 (cited in note 4) (quoting Professor John Jeffries
of the University of Virginia Law School to the effect that "every public institution in
America ... take[s] racial diversity in admissions"). Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action:
Past, Present, and Future, 20 Yale L & Pol Rev 1, 9 (2002) ("no other domain practices and
supports [affirmative action] so enthusiastically"). Certainly, the litigants who defend such
programs take that position. In their brief to the Sixth Circuit, defendants in Gratz v
Bollinger, 277 F3d 803 (6th Cir 2001), cert granted at 2002 US LEXIS 8681, a case chal-
lenging the consideration of race in a system of undergraduate admissions at the Univer-
sity of Michigan, wrote (perhaps a bit hyperbolically) that "[t]his case presents an issue of
great national importance whose resolution will affect the admissions program of every
public and private institution of higher education in this country." Final Brief of Appellees
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Their sponsors are hardly "besieged"; they are openly defending
these policies with significant sums of money and casting asper-
sions on those who disagree. 3 They are the elites, and they resent
efforts to go over their heads to the people. 4 This elitism is per-
haps one reason why RCDM has become so unpopular, but it is
(01-1333 & 01-1418) and Appellants (01-1416) at viii, Gratz v Bollinger, No 01-1333, 01-
1416 & 01-1418, (6th Cir Jul 30, 2001), available online at <http://www.umich.edu/-urel/
admissions/legal]gratz/gratz-appeal.html> (visited October 18, 2001) [on file with U Chi
Legal F]. See also Issacharoff, 59 Ohio State L J at 670 (cited in note 5) (noting that the
admissions program of University of Texas Law School "mirrored that of most other com-
parable institutions"); Lee Bollinger and Nancy Cantor, The Educational Importance of
Race, Wash Post A17 (Apr 28, 1998) ("Virtually all institutions with selective admissions
consider race when they choose among applicants.").
13 With respect to the amounts of money spent by RCDM's defenders see Liz Cobbs,
New U-M Attorney A Winner in High Court, Ann Arbor News (Sept 5, 2002), available
online at <http://www.mlive.com/news/aanews/index.ssf?/xml/story.ssf/html-standard.xsl?
/baselnews-1/1031236849188085.xml> (visited Oct 17, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F]
(reporting that the University of Michigan has spent $8.5 million in legal fees defending
its admissions systems). With respect to aspersions against their opponents, see, for ex-
ample, Defendant-Intervenors' Brief In Support Of Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment and In Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment at 2, Grut-
ter v Bollinger, No 97-CV-75928-DT (E D Mich filed Nov 20, 2000), available online at
<http'//www.bamn.com/doc/2000/0011-sj.pdf> (visited Nov 30, 2002) [on file with U Chi
Legal F] ("Defendant-Intervenors' Brief") ("[Plaintiff asks the Court openly to spurn the
past gains and present claims of the Civil Rights Movement"); id at 11 (citing deposition of
UM President Lee Bollinger for the proposition that eliminating RCDM "would result in
the 'resegregation' of the [UM] Law School and of higher education in general"); id at 24
(describing plaintiff's position as a "racist view of equality"); id ("[Pilaintiff appeals to
other privileged whites to join her in falsely equating index scores with merit"); Defen-
dant-Intervenors' Brief at 30 n 17 (noting that an organization established "to support
eugenics and the 'Caucasian race'" had given money to the Center for Individual Rights);
id at 35 ("Plaintiff... would have the Court impose a racist double standard on the [UM]
Law School and the students who apply to go there"); id (asserting that plaintiff's argu-
ments are characterized by "crassness, superficiality, and [the] presumption of black infe-
riority").
14 Indeed, my fellow panelist at the University of Chicago Legal Forum's 2001 Sympo-
sium, "The Scope of Equal Protection," Professor Samuel Issacharoff, has argued passion-
ately that it is the very elitism of the elite public institutions that should be considered a
"compelling interest" (along with the interest in integrating racial minorities into society
as a whole). Issacharoff, 59 Ohio St L J at 684 (cited in note 5). RCDM, argues Issacharoff,
is the only way to achieve reasonable amounts of integration while maintaining the high
academic standards that elitism requires. Id. My guess is that Professor Issacharoff's
factual assertion is probably true, although I am not as convinced of his corollary predic-
tion that an elite school that maintains high academic standards in the face of a directive
to use race-neutral admissions standards quickly will lose public support. Further, his
insistence that maintaining elite public institutions of higher education is a compelling
governmental interest is questionable. In any event, though, this is plainly a defense of
RCDM in modern admissions policies that is far more attuned to reality than Justice
Powell's. See also Dershowitz and Hanft, 1 Cardozo L Rev at 419 (cited in note 5) (increas-
ing the number of minority group members in the universities and professions "surely is
the concern that actuates the movement for university affirmative action today").
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hardly the only reason or even a primary one.' I think there are
three leading causes.
First, the Johnson race running metaphor-"You do not take
a person who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate
him"-was most effective when RCDM primarily aided African
Americans. At the outset it was primarily such a system." Over
time, however, whether to increase the political base for RCDM
or for some other reason, African Americans themselves have ac-
ceded to the expansion of the policy to other ethnicities. But the
history of those other groups is simply not sufficiently compara-
ble to the history of African Americans.17 Even Native Americans,
who certainly have had a uniquely difficult history, cannot make
the same moral claim as African Americans-who, after all, have
experienced both slavery and Jim Crow-for "group justice."
When one then considers Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Asian
Indians, as well as "white minorities" like Jews, Italian Ameri-
cans, and Irish Americans, the distinctions between the groups
and their histories become even harder to discern. If an RCDM
policy gives preference to Hispanics, but not Jews and Asian
Americans, the moral argument based upon past discrimination
becomes very difficult to make.
A second reason for the increasing unpopularity of RCDM is
the growth of the African-American middle class. Even if it were
"' Professor Schuck surveys other opinion polls, and arrives at a similar conclusion
concerning its unpopularity, concluding that "[n]o researcher in this field doubts, however,
that the public's opinion remains decidedly and intensely negative." Schuck, 20 Yale L &
Pol Rev at 56 (cited in note 12). He also notes that opposition to RCDM seems to span the
political spectrum. Id at 57. See also Richard A. Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future of
Affirmative Action, 67 Cal L Rev 171, 172 (1979) (vast majority of American people and
almost 2/3 of all non-whites would have been pleased with a decision in Bakke outlawing
reverse discrimination broadly).
i6 Judge Laurence H. Silberman, who served in the Nixon Labor Department and had
significant responsibility for formulating the "Philadelphia Plan" that crystallized RCDM
in federal contracting, reports that "although other minorities were nominally included in
our affirmative action efforts, it was the plight of American blacks that drove the whole
policy." Laurence H. Silberman, The Origin of Affirmative Action as We Know It-The
Philadelphia Plan Pivot 10 (Federalist 2001) (addressing the Labor & Employment Prac-
tice Group of the Federalist Society for Law & Public Policy, October 10, 2001). See also
Schuck, 20 Yale L and Pol Rev at 59 (cited in note 12) (attention in early years was en-
tirely on African Americans); Terrance Sandalow, Book Review, Identity and Equality:
Minority Preferences Reconsidered, 97 Mich L Rev 1874, 1875 n 2 (1999) (reviewing Wil-
liam G. Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of Con-
sidering Race in College and University Admissions (Princeton 1999)) ("The policies were
initially adopted because of, and I believe the primary impetus for their attention remains,
the perceived importance of increasing black enrollment in colleges and universities").
" See Mark S. Nadel, A Four-Element Affirmative Action Alternative to Racial Pref-
erences 22 n 136 (manuscript on file with author).
[2002:
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confined solely to African Americans, RCDM would have less
moral force than it did when President Johnson spoke for the
simple reason that the "chains" metaphor is somewhat overstated
for many African Americans today. Indeed, no one disputes that
African Americans generally have done increasingly well as a
group economically.18 When specific beneficiaries of RCDM seem
to the white majority to have lived lives not too much different
from their own, the moral case for RCDM is diminished. Propo-
nents of RCDM claim that Clarence Thomas was a beneficiary of
RCDM,2 ° but the question today is not whether Clarence Thomas
should have been a beneficiary of RCDM, but whether his son
should as well.
The third reason for RCDM's failing reputation, is Justice
Powell's decision in Bakke and the Court's failure to take a simi-
lar case in the intervening years.2' Justice Powell rejected societal
18 See generally Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom, America in Black and White: One
Nation, Indivisible; Race In Modern America 183-202 (Touchstone 1997). Schuck, 20 Yale
L & Pol Rev at 62 (cited in note 12) (progress has been "nothing short of astonishing"),
quoting Orlando Patterson, The Ordeal Of Integration: Progress and Resentment in Amer-
ica's Racial Crisis 15 (Counterpoint 1997).The Post article discussed earlier in this section
reported that "[bilacks have made dramatic progress in many, if not most areas of Ameri-
can life. There have never been more blacks in the middle class or a larger share who have
graduated from high school, gone to college, or entered professional schools." Morin, Mis-
perceptions, Wash Post at Al (cited in note 9). The article quoted Keith Reeves, a political
scientist at Swarthmore College, to the effect that increasing and visible African American
success may be the reason for the white misperceptions that the poll reported. Id. Indeed,
even in 1979, Dershowitz and Hanft asserted that "not all minority group members have
been educationally disadvantaged," a proposition which is surely even more true today
than it was then. 1 Cardozo L Rev at 416 (cited in note 5).
19 Dershowitz and Hanft, 1 Cardozo L Rev at 416 (cited in note 5) ("The fact that
certain advantaged minority persons who benefit under race-specific programs would no
longer receive windfall benefits under a race-neutral program [assisting the socioeconomi-
cally disadvantaged] should not be cause for distress; these are precisely the persons who
do not-under any principle of morality-deserve to be given any special advantage.").
RCDM supporters repeatedly assert that (not surprisingly) using socioeconomic status as
a substitute diversity factor would not achieve the same racial diversity as using race
directly. See, for example, Grutter, 288 F3d at 764 (Clay concurring). If so, that can only
be because some minority beneficiaries of RCDM would not be the beneficiaries of a pro-
gram emphasizing socioeconomic diversity-because they are not socioeconomically di-
verse (i.e., poor).
20 Mark C. Niles, Clarence Thomas: The First Ten Years Looking for Consistency, 10
Am U J Gender Soc Pol & L 327, 338 n 53 (2002). Thomas has denied at least part of this
contention. Id at 339 & n 54.
21 See Dershowitz and Hanft, 1 Cardozo L Rev at 381 (cited in note 5) (noting pro-
phetically that the Bakke decision "will be all the more important if other guidance is not
forthcoming from the Court"); Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value in American
Higher Education?, 52 Fla L Rev 861, 861 (2000) (noting that the word "diversity" has
become increasingly important in a generation); Samuel Issacharoff, Law And Misdirec-
tion in the Debate Over Affirmative Action, 2002 U Chi Legal F 11:
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discrimination and increasing minority representation as justifi-
cations for RCDM in college admissions, and replaced them with
"diversity." Instead of focusing attention on the effects that Jim
Crow might have had on the ability of African Americans to com-
pete for spots at the Davis Medical School, Justice Powell turned
the spotlight on the Davis Medical School's "academic freedom" to
consider race in the admissions policy.2" For a variety of reasons
(not the least of which is that no one else on the court mentioned
the words "academic freedom"), this has proved to be a most dis-
satisfying justification.
II. THE "DIVERSITY" RATIONALE RECONSIDERED
In Bakke, the Court found that the admissions program of the
University of California Medical School at Davis, which set aside
16% of the places for incoming students for educationally or eco-
nomically disadvantaged minorities, was unconstitutional.23 Five
justices, however, concluded that race could be considered in
Davis's admissions process under some circumstances. No single
theory, though, explained why that was so. 4
Justice Powell, in an opinion only for himself, applied strict
scrutiny to the Davis program. He concluded that "academic free-
dom," although not a specifically enumerated Constitutional
right, was a "special concern" of the First Amendment and thus a
sufficiently compelling interest to meet strict scrutiny. 5 The Re-
gents specifically wanted their institutions to select a group of
students who would contribute to a robust exchange of ideas, and
argued that "ethnic diversity" was a means of achieving that
I suggest that diversity came to its current life with the narrow window
left open by Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Assuming that swing opin-
ion to have the force of the Court, the defenses of affirmative action were
limited to either the internal claim of educational product enhancement
or the retrospective claim of remedying institutional discrimination.
Id at 16 & n 29 (footnotes omitted).
22 Bakke, 438 US at 312-15.
' Id at 269-72.
2 Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US 200, 218 (1995) ("Bakke did not produce
an opinion for the Court."). In Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275 (2001), the four dissent-
ers in Adarand made a similar (if not more trenchant) observation, viz., that the Bakke
majority for overturning the injunction against using race was "divided over the applica-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause-and by extension Title VI-to affirmative action
cases. Therefore, it is somewhat strange to treat the opinions of those five Justices in
Bakke as constituting a majority for any particular substantive interpretation of Title VI."
Id at 308 n 15 (Stevens dissenting).
25 Bakke, 438 US at 312 (Powell).
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goal.' While rejecting the argument that Davis's specific program
of reserving spaces for disadvantaged minorities was necessary to
achieve the robust exchange of ideas that the Regents allegedly
wanted, Justice Powell did state that race and ethnicity could be
considered as "plus" factors by universities seeking to achieve
that goal. Justice Powell opined that a state interest in a robust
exchange of ideas would not justify the consideration of race to
achieve the ethnic diversity promoted by UC Davis, but could jus-
tify its consideration to achieve a diversity which "encompasses a
far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element',n
The first problem with the "academic freedom" rationale is
that no other member of the Court adopted it. Thus, its value as
precedent has always been questionable. 8 But aside from that, its
internal coherence leaves much to be desired.
Contrary to popular myth, Justice Powell did not hold that
diversity itself is a compelling governmental interest. Rather, he
held that a school's academic freedom was a compelling interest,
and that a school could pursue a policy of attaining a diverse stu-
dent body as part of its academic freedom interest in determining
who shall be a part of the student body. But almost as soon as
Justice Powell granted that freedom as compelling, he took it
away. "Ethnic diversity.., is only one element in a range of fac-
tors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a
heterogeneous student body" because "constitutional limitations
26 Id at 313-315.
27 Idat315.
See note 24 and accompanying text. Lower court judges have disagreed about its
precedential value. Compare Grutter v Bollinger, 288 F3d 732 (6th Cir 2002) (5-4 majority
of en banc Sixth Circuit concluding that Powell's opinion had precedential value under
doctrine of United States v Marks, 430 US 188 (1977)), cert granted at 2002 US LEXIS
8677; Smith v University of Washington Law School, 233 F3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir 2000)
(upholding precedential value of Powell's rationale); and Gratz v Bollinger, 122 F Supp 2d
811, 822 (E D Mich 2000) (somewhat ambiguous with respect to precedential value of
Powell's rationale, but upholding diversity as a compelling governmental interest), with
Grutter 288 F3d at 776-77 (Boggs dissenting) (concluding that Powell's opinion is not
precedential); Johnson v Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, 263 F3d 1234, 1249
(11th Cir 2001) (same); Hopwood v Texas, 78 F3d 932, 944 (5th Cir 1996) (same); Hopwood
v Texas, 236 F3d 256, 274-75 (5th Cir 2000) (adhering to earlier Hopwood decision and
explicitly disagreeing with Ninth Circuit's Marks analysis in Smith); Grutter v Bollinger,
137 F Supp 2d 821, 847 (E D Mich 2001) (holding that Powell's opinion is not preceden-
tial), revd, 288 F3d 732 (6th Cir 2002); and Peters v Moses, 613 F Supp 1328, 1335 (W D
Va 1985) (same).
Bakke, 438 US at 312 (Powell) ("The freedom of a university to make its own judg-
ments as to education includes the selection of its student body.").
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protecting individual rights may not be disregarded. ' °
"[P]etitioner's argument that [ethnic diversity] is the only effec-
tive means of serving the interests of diversity is seriously
flawed."' "Petitioner's special admissions program, focused solely
on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment
of genuine diversity.""
This is an odd species of "academic freedom" indeed. Whose
"diversity" does Davis Medical School have the freedom to adopt?
Its own? Apparently not. True academic freedom presumably
would permit institutions to reserve spots to attain "ethnic diver-
sity" if it deemed ethnic diversity to be far more important than
intellectual (or any other form) of diversity. But Justice Powell
condemns Davis's own vision of diversity as "seriously flawed"
and "hinder[ing] ... genuine diversity," as if he gets to decide how
Davis exercises its academic freedom." Justice Powell finally con-
cludes that Davis Medical School only has the academic freedom
to imitate Harvard.34
Of course, the problem is that no one (including Justice Pow-
ell, apparently) seriously believes that institutions have the com-
plete freedom to make their own judgments about who may be
admitted to study. If they did, presumably a segregationist insti-
tution would have the equal freedom to keep out members of dis-
favored races.35 The Supreme Court apparently rejected that no-
tion in Runyon v McCrary.3' Thus, diversity has been left alone,
nearly stripped of Justice Powell's initial academic freedom ra-
tionale, as the "compelling interest."
Runyon highlights yet another peculiarity of Bakke. The de-
fendant in Runyon was a private school, and had no First
Amendment right to make race-based decisions on admissions.
Davis Medical School is a state institution, and the court holds
that it does have that right. Yet the First Amendment is normally
30 Id at 314.
31 Id at 315.
32 Id.
3 Bakke, 438 US at 315 (Powell).
"4 Id at 316-17 (discussing Harvard College's admissions program). Professor Alan
Dershowitz and Laura Hanit already have described the irony of adopting an admissions
system whose original focus on "well-rounded" students had its origins in a system to
reduce the number of Jews attending Harvard. Dershowitz and Hanft, 1 Cardozo L Rev at
386-99 (cited in note 5).
15 See Issacharoff, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 37-38 (cited in note 21) (no serious scholar
would argue that an empirical claim that homogeneity benefits educational outcomes
could be used to consider race as a means of reinforcing segregation).
427 US 160 (1976).
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considered to be a shield wielded by private citizens against the
state.7
One need not fear only lesser institutions' exercise of aca-
demic freedom. Harvard itself once focused on reducing the num-
ber of Jews from the city, and increasing the number of students
from rural (and Protestant) areas because it believed that the
latter would be better "raw material" for the production of "Har-
vard men" that the institution had been known for.' That is,
Harvard wanted to exercise (and did exercise) its academic free-
dom to achieve more homogeneity rather than heterogeneity (or,
more kindly, a different kind of heterogeneity).39 Such is the na-
ture of academic freedom when it comes to a school's right to de-
termine who is admitted.
The only other Justice who has suggested that something
akin to "academic freedom" would be a permissible rationale to
use race was Justice Stevens in his Wygant v Jackson Board of
3' Hopwood, 78 F3d at 943 n 25.
3' See Dershowitz and Hanft, 1 Cardozo L Rev at 390-91 (cited in note 5). The Admis-
sions Chair described the policy as follows:
Race is part of the record. It is by no means the whole record and no man
will be kept out on grounds of race; but those racial characteristics which
make for race isolation will, if they are borne by the individual, be taken
into consideration as a part of that individual's characteristics under the
test of character, personality, and promise.
That if there should result in fact any substantial change in the propor-
tion of groups in the College following application of the test, this will be
due, not to race discrimination or any quota system, but to the failure of
particular individuals to possess as individuals those evidences of charac-
ter, personality and promise which weighed with other evidences render
them more fit than other individuals to receive all that Harvard has to of-
fer. Of course there will be criticisms. It will be said that Harvard is dis-
criminating on grounds of race. That will not be true.
The New Admissions Plan, The Gadfly 4 (May 1926), quoted in id at 391. See also Kron-
man, 52 Fla L Rev at 874 (cited in note 21) ("At the beginning of the twentieth century,
the goal of liberal education was widely understood to be the production of cultured gen-
tlemen.").
'9 The ultimate Harvard plan in the 1920s rejected discrimination, but involved an
increased effort to "nationalize" Harvard by making the school more accessible to students
from the South and West. Dershowitz and Hanft describe this as "perpetuat[ing] the white
Protestant homogeneity of its student body." 1 Cardozo L Rev at 398 (cited in note 5). They
assert that "[tihe Midwestern farm boy and the Southern lawyer's son were admitted not
so much because of the diversity they might provide but primarily because they were seen
as far more similar to typical Harvard students than was the first generation immigrant
from New York." Id at 400. They do concede that those geographically unusual students
did "add a modicum of diversity by way of some different values," id, and, of course, Har-
vard could have exercised its academic freedom to avoid even that modicum. That is, Har-
vard was seeking a kind of diversity, even if some might question its motive.
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Education0 dissent.41 Justice Stevens asserted that a school
board's decision to retain an African-American teacher because
she was an African American (over an equally-qualified white
applicant) should be analyzed by "asking whether the Board's
action advances the public interest in educating children for the
future."'2 Since it was "quite obvious that a school board may rea-
sonably conclude that an integrated faculty will be able to provide
benefits to the student body that could not be provided by an all-
white, or nearly all-white faculty," the RCDM policy in Wygant
stated a valid public interest. In addressing whether another
board might appropriately think that segregation might "lead to
better academic achievement," Justice Stevens just punted.' He
immediately abandoned the assumption of his hypothetical (that
a school board might think that segregation led to better educa-
tional outcomes), and assumed that the decision would necessar-
ily rest on the "false premise that differences in race, or in the
color of a person's skin, reflect real differences that are relevant
to a person's right to share in the blessings of a free society." Be-
cause such a decision would be exclusionary, rather than inclu-
sionary-a somewhat contrived set of categories, since every de-
cision for a competitive position both includes someone and ex-
cludes someone-Justice Stevens concluded that only the inclu-
sionary RCDM was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
Of course, Justice Stevens's analysis assumes that the Equal
Protection Clause has an ultimate goal of "inclusion" (whatever
that means) rather than equal treatment; equal (or "more equal")
results rather than equal process. Justice Stevens's contention
that the "inclusionary decision is consistent with the principle
40 476 US 267 (1986).
41 Id at 313 (Stevens dissenting).
42 Id.
43 Id at 316 (Stevens dissenting).
4 Wygant, 476 US at 316 (Stevens dissenting). Thus, Justice Stevens abandoned the
suggestion that the "exclusionary" decision could be a school board's legitimate effort, for
example, to reduce racial tensions that were interfering with the educational process.
Long before Justice Stevens, Professor Van Alstyne took the hypothetical much more
seriously. Writing in opposition to any sort of "compelling interest" at all, Van Alstyne
demonstrates how simple it would have been for legislatures to devise a compelling inter-
est for segregated schools, and how difficult it would be for an honest court to either dis-
prove the "compelling" nature of the interest or demonstrate that it was a pretext, had the
compelling interest test been widely known prior to Brown v Board of Education, 337 US
443 (1954). William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Con-
stitution, 46 U Chi L Rev 775, 796-798 (1979).
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that all men are created equal"' is stated in an ipse dixit fashion;
one could easily contend that any use of RCDM, inclusionary or
exclusionary, is a violation of the general principle of "equality"
before the law."6
Even more peculiar is Justice Stevens's insistence that con-
sideration of race is absolutely prohibited in determining who
may serve on juries because it is "utterly irrational" to believe any
benefit could come from it." If it is "far more convincing" to ex-
perience the truth that skin color does not matter from an Afri-
can-American teacher," one might think that experiencing truths
about African-American life in America today might be more con-
vincing from an African-American fellow juror rather than a
white one." To the extent such experiences are relevant, could not
a court administrator, a county, or a prosecutor conclude that
racially-integrated juries-which we can assume can be reached
in some particular instances in certain areas only through
RCDM-"provide benefits to [the administration of justice] that
could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white,
jury]? '° Like Justice Powell, Justice Stevens offers no explana-
" Wygant, 476 US at 313 (Stevens dissenting). Of course, the reference is to the sec-
ond paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, and is one of the "self-evident truths"
to which that document refers. It has been generally understood that the "equality" to
which the Declaration refers is an equality before the law, an equality of rights. Darlene
C. Goring, Private Problems, Public Solution: Affirmative Action in the 21st Century, 33
Akron L Rev 209, 238-39 (2000) (tracing Justice Powell's concept of "equality" to the Dec-
laration and describing debates around the time of the Civil War Amendments to the
Constitution that refer to the Declaration as providing equal rights).
46 See Goring, 33 Akron L Rev at 238-39 (cited in note 45).
41 Wygant, 476 US at 313 (Stevens dissenting).
Id at 315 (Stevens dissenting).
49 Alternatively, race-based jury selections may serve the same interest as race-based
selection of judges: assuring minorities of the fairness of the system. See Schuck, 20 Yale
L & Pol Rev at 31 (cited in note 12) ("For minorities to accept their outcomes as minimally
just or at least acceptable, they must view these institutions as inclusive and procedurally
fair. Being tried by minority judges, for example may advance that goal."); Sandalow, 97
Mich L Rev at 1912 (cited in note 16) (black lawyers, judges, and police officers may be
needed to provide assurances of fairness and inclusion to blacks). The American Bar Asso-
ciation makes such an argument to support RCDM in higher education, and indeed,
analogizes to the importance of juries not excluding racial minorities. See Brief of the
American Bar Association, as Amicus Curiae at 23-25, Grutter v Bollinger, 288 F3d 732
(6th Cir 2002). It does not assert that we should consciously include racial minorities i
juries (through RCDM), which would be the more relevant analogy in my view. See also
United States v Allen-Brown, 243 F3d 1293, 1298-99 (11th Cir 2001) (defense attorney's
effort to obtain more diversity on predominantly-white jury by using peremptory chal-
lenges was not in pursuit of a sufficiently compelling reason and hence unconstitutional).
o Wygant, 476 US at 315 (Stevens dissenting). Justice Stevens also asserted that race
could never rationally be used to determine who would be a fit parent. Id at 313. This, of
course, is hardly a non-controversial assertion. Adoption agencies do sometimes use the
race of an adopting couple as a consideration in determining the most appropriate home.
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tion that really can limit the use of RCDM to education." Indeed,
unlike Justice Powell, it would seem that Justice Stevens has no
desire to do so.
Justice Stevens's "public interest" analysis is just Justice
Powell's "academic freedom" interest extended a bit more toward
(but not reaching) its logical conclusion. Deference is given to the
public policy choices of those with whom the Justice agrees (Har-
vard), and not to others (Davis or segregationists). The analysis is
applied haphazardly to some areas (like education) but not others
(juries) without any real explanation as to why there are no bene-
fits from integration in the excluded areas. Race can be used so
long as a plausible benefit can be defined (educational improve-
ments from "diversity"). For better or worse, it is a prescription
for the use of RCDM in large areas of our society. 2
Indeed, they have been known to prevent a cross-racial adoption even if no other couple is
ready to adopt the child. See, for example, Cynthia R. Mabry, "Love Alone Is Not Enough!"
in Transracial Adoptions: Scrutinizing Recent Statutes, Agency Policies, and Prospective
Adoptive Parents, 42 Wayne L Rev 1347, 1359 (1996) (noting such instances as a motiva-
tion for the Multiethnic Placement Act). Indeed, in Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429 (1984),
the case cited by Justice Stevens for the proposition that race cannot be used to determine
who is a fit parent, see Wygant, 476 US at 313 n 5, the lower courts had explicitly deter-
mined that the "best interests of the child" would not be served by placing a child with his
mother, who had remarried interracially, because of the social stigma that interracial
marriages would entail. The Court in Palmore did not dispute the factual findings of the
lower court. Indeed, the Court agreed that "[tihere is a risk that a child living with a step-
parent of a different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not present
if the child were living with parents of the same racial or ethnic origin." Palmore, 466 US
at 433. Thus, contrary to Justice Stevens's reinterpretation of Palmore, the Court never
suggested that it was "utterly irrational" to consider race in such situations because "it is
completely unrelated to any valid public purpose." Wygant, 476 US at 313 (Stevens dis-
senting). Rather, the Court held that the valid public purpose had to give way to the more
important constitutional rule of equal treatment, primarily because society could not allow
private biases to influence the outcome under that valid public purpose.
6' Perhaps recognizing this dilemma, Dean Kronman focuses his defense of diversity
on the improvements in classroom learning, and not learning that takes place outside of
the classroom, that it provides. Kronman, 52 Fla L Rev at 896 (cited in note 21) ("[11f one
want to know why diversity of experience and values is an educational good not just in the
general sense that interaction with others from different backgrounds is an occasion for
learning in any organizational setting, but in the more specific sense that it contributes to
the distinctive goals of our colleges and universities, it is necessary to ask how such diver-
sity promotes the specialized activity of disciplined instruction for whose sake these
institutions exist, and to shift our attention from the dorm to the classroom."). But to say
that classroom learning is unique to the educational goals of universities hardly
demonstrates that it is more compelling than "dorm learning" or 'Jury learning" or any
other kind of learning.
62 See generally Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race As Proxy, and Religion As Proxy, 43
UCLA L Rev 2059 (1996) (demonstrating that assumption that race can be used as a proxy
for intellectual diversity can justify RCDM in a wide variety of situations).
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III. MORE PROBLEMS WITH BAKKE
There are various other (mostly well-known) difficulties with
the Powell decision in Bakke that I will briefly enumerate. 5  First,
although he certainly does not say so, Justice Powell does suggest
that there are various viewpoints associated with different eth-
nicities." Second, the distinction between a "plus" given to a
member of a racial minority and the simple set-aside system used
by Davis in Bakke has been roundly criticized, including in Bakke
itself.55 This is particularly so given Justice Powell's assertion
that weights applied to race and other diversity factors "may vary
from year to year depending upon the 'mix' both of the student
body and the applicants for the incoming class"5 and his some-
what vague references to the degree to which a school could look
at numbers." Indeed, he ultimately endorsed a Harvard system
that seemed to operate with great attention to numbers."
I identify here only the problems with the substantive rationale for RCDM. I have
discussed elsewhere other jurisdictional and procedural problems, most of which (again)
are fairly well-known. See Michael E. Rosman, The Error of"Hopwood's Error", 29 J of L
& Educ 355, 357-58 (2000).
" This was certainly a concern for the Hopwood court. Hopwood, 78 F3d 932, 946 (5th
Cir 1996) ("To believe that a person's race controls his point of view is to stereotype him.").
Bakke, 438 US at 379 (Brennan concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (there was no basis "for preferring a particular preference program simply because
in achieving the same goals that [Davis] is pursuing, it proceeds in a manner that is not
immediately apparent to the public."). A number of lower courts seem to agree with Jus-
tice Brennan on this point, and have concluded that there really is no difference between a
"plus" system and a set-aside. See Middleton v City of Flint, 92 F3d 396, 412-13 (6th Cir
1996) ("[W]e note that quotas and preferences are easily transformed from one into the
other."), citing Bakke, 438 US at 378 (Brennan, concurring and dissenting); Hopwood, 78
F3d at 948 n 36 (noting that "even if a 'plus' system were permissible, it likely would be
impossible to maintain such a system without degeneration into nothing more than a
'quota' program"), citing Bakke, 438 US at 378 (Brennan concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); Valentine v Smith, 654 F2d 503, 510 n 15 (8th Cir 1981)
("Any distinction between goals, quotas, and targets is primarily semantic."), citing Bakke,
438 US at 378 (Brennan concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Bakke, 438 US at 318 (Powell).
57 Justice Powell quoted the amicus brief of various institutions, which included an
appendix describing the policy at Harvard College:
In Harvard College admissions the Committee has not set target-quotas
for the number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physicists or
Californians to be admitted in a given year ... But that awareness [of the
necessity of including more than a token number of black students] does
not mean that the Committee sets a minimum number of blacks or of
people from west of the Mississippi who are to be admitted. It means only
that in choosing among thousands of applicants who are not only 'admis-
sible' academically but have other strong qualities, the Committee with a
number of criteria in mind, pays some attention to distribution among
many types and categories of students.
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Even more perplexing, it is not altogether clear that the dif-
ference between a "plus" system and a "set-aside" system is sim-
ply a difference between a system that is narrowly tailored and
one that is not. Rather, Justice Powell suggested that "strict scru-
tiny" might not be applicable at all to a "plus" system because "a
facial intent to discriminate" does not "exist[U in an admissions
program where race or ethnic background is simply one ele-
ment-to be weighed fairly against other elements-in the selec-
tion process."9 In such a system, "good faith would be presumed,"0
there would be "a presumption of legality and legitimate educa-
tional purpose,"' and "there is no warrant for judicial interference
in the academic process.""2 The absence of an intent to discrimi-
nate and the presumption of good faith certainly suggests a stan-
dard other than strict scrutiny.6
Id at 316, quoting Appendix to Brief for Columbia University, Harvard University, Stan-
ford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, as Amicus Curiae, Regents of the
University of California v Bakke, No 76-811, *2-3 (filed Jun 7, 1977), reprinted in Philip
B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper, eds, 99 Landmark Briefs of the Supreme Court of the
United States 689 (Univ Pubs of Am 1978). Id at 323 (Appendix to opinion of Justice Pow-
ell) (Harvard College Admissions Program) ("[A] truly heterogen[e]ous environment that
reflects the rich diversity of the United States .... cannot be provided without some atten-
tion to numbers.").
'8 Dershowitz and Hanft note that, in practice, the Harvard College admissions pro-
gram yielded an uncanny stability in the proportion of African Americans in each class. 1
Cardozo L Rev at 383 n 13 (cited in note 5) (noting that the percentage of African Ameri-
cans in Harvard classes from 1973 through 1981 was 7 percent in every year but one,
when it was 8 percent).
59 Bakke, 438 US at 318 (Powell).
60 Id at 318-19.
6" Id at 319 n 53.
62 Id. Thus, if these words were taken seriously, review of "plus" programs might be
similar to the review of the use of race in redistricting programs, where strict scrutiny is
not even reached unless race is a "predominant" factor. Hunt v Cromartie, 121 S Ct 1452,
1464 (2001) ("'Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed
with consciousness of race), quoting Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 958 (1996) (O'Connor's
principal opinion). To my knowledge, all the courts that have analyzed RCDM in higher
education apply strict scrutiny, and thus implicitly reject the analogy (or, conversely,
assume that race is a predominant factor). Nonetheless, Representative John Conyers (D-
Mich), among others, submitted an amicus brief in the Grutter case that argued by anal-
ogy to the redistricting cases. Amicus Brief of John Conyers, et al., at 9-11, Grutter v
Bollinger, 288 F3d 732 (6th Cir 2002).
Of course, this too is entirely incomprehensible. How can the consideration of race
as a factor, even if considered along with other factors, not reflect an intention to dis-
criminate (in the sense of differentiate)? See Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228, 265
(1989) (O'Connor concurring in the judgment) ("This Court's decisions under the Equal
Protection Clause have long recognized that whatever the final outcome of a decisional
process, the inclusion of race or sex as a consideration within it harms both society and
the individual"). If a system like that used at the University of Georgia or the University
of Michigan awarded "points" to certain races, but also awarded points for other non-racial
characteristics, does it really make sense to assert there is no facial intent to discrimi-
451 BAKKE AND RACE-CONSCIOUS DECISION-MAKING 61
Still there are even more questions raised by Powell's opin-
ion: must an institution include all possible diversity factors, or is
it sufficient to include a few besides race? What is the rationale
for excluding religion or sexual orientation? Is it sufficient that
the school expects that kind of "diversity" to occur "naturally"?' In
truth, as everyone knows, it is impossible to give preferences to
all different diversifying characteristics, and some groups-
indeed, some ethnic or racial groups-will simply not be present
in significant numbers.!' Does a system that provides some ad-
vantage for African Americans and Hispanics, but not Arab
Americans, indicate a facial intent to discriminate in Justice
Powell's universe?
Finally, Justice Powell's Bakke opinion is sadly ironic. As
Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke pointed out, the Davis pro-
gram was limited to those "within a general class of persons
likely to have been the victims of discrimination."w Indeed, the
dissenters found this consideration important in concluding that
the Davis program met their somewhat lower level of scrutiny:
[Tlhe Davis admissions program does not simply equate
minority status with disadvantage. Rather, Davis consid-
ers on an individual basis each applicant's personal his-
tory to determine whether he or she has likely been disad-
vantaged by racial discrimination. The record makes clear
nate? Equally-situated members of preferred races and non-preferred races are treated
differently. If "[t]he denial to [Bakke] of [a] right to individualized consideration without
regard to his race [was] the principal evil of [Davis's] special admissions program," Bakke,
438 US at 318 n 52, it is hard to understand why the Harvard program did not have the
same precise evil. See Dershowitz and Hanft, 1 Cardozo L Rev at 409 n 102 (cited in note
5).
So, too, how does one "weigh fairly" race with other criteria if "the weight attributed
to a particular quality may vary from year to year depending upon the 'mix' both of the
student body and the applicants for the incoming class." Bakke, 438 US at 317-18 (Powell).
If the mix of students or pool of incoming applicants dictates that race be given ten times
the weight of great musical talent, what precisely is "fair" about the comparative weigh-
ing? Compare Issacharoff, 59 Ohio St L J at 676 (cited in note 5) ("Bakke had an unrealis-
tic sense of the extent to which race-consciousness is required, even to achieve the Har-
vard minimum floor of minority representation"); Schuck, 20 Yale L & Pol Rev at 17-22
(cited in note 12) (characterizing the preferences in higher education as very large).
Wessmann v Gittens, 160 F3d 790, 798 (1st Cir 1998) (reporting this argument
being made by a competitive high school that used RCDM in admitting students).
As Professor Issacharoff puts it, if diversity is the real objective "one must wonder
why preferential admission is limited to groups that are defined to some extent by histo-
ries of being subject to official discrimination." Issacharoff, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 22 (cited
in note 21).
Bakke, 438 US at 363 (Brennan concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
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that only minority applicants likely to have been isolated
from the mainstream of American life are considered in
the special program; other minority applicants are eligible
only through the regular admissions program... [Sipecific
proof that a person has been victimized by discrimination
is not a necessary predicate to offering him relief where
the probability of victimization is great.7
The dissenters also found that the constitutionality of the
Davis program "is buttressed by its restriction to only 16% of the
positions in the Medical School, a percentage less than that of the
minority population in California."6'
Justice Powell's opinion is ironic because it ignored the limi-
tation on preferences that the Davis "quota" actually provided,
confining it to likely victims of societal discrimination and within
reasonable proportions of the total student population. 9 Even
more importantly, it rejected a program that at least made some
effort to conform itself to the original purpose of RCDM-which,
at least to some degree, hearkened back to President Johnson's
"chains" analogy-and gave its imprimatur to a program that
provided preferences to those for whom the "chains" analogy
would be least applicable. This result is perhaps the saddest part
of the Bakke legacy."0
67 Id at 377-78. See also id at 275 n 4 (Powell) (the admissions chairman would con-
firm "disadvantage" of individual applicants).
68 Id at 374 n 58 (Brennan concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
To be sure, the opinion stated that that benchmark was not necessarily a constitutional
one. But it also made clear that the Bakke case did not raise the question of a program
that admitted racial minorities "in numbers significantly in excess of their proportional
representation in the relevant population." Bakke, 438 US at 374 n 58. Such programs, the
Brennan group noted, "might well be inadequately justified by the legitimate remedial
objectives." Id. But see Van Alstyne, 46 U Chi L Rev at 800 (cited in note 44) (benchmark
population statistic should not matter under a compelling interest test).
69 In contrast, the University of Washington School of Law repeatedly had proportions
of racial and ethnic minorities far in excess of the proportion of minorities in the popula-
tion of the state of Washington. Smith v University of Washington School of Law, Slip Op
Civ No 97-335Z, 28 (Finding of Fact # 92) (W D Wash June 5, 2002) (Asian-Americans
constituted about 5% of the population of the State of Washington and 14% of the enrolled
class), available online at <http://lib.law.washington.edu/research/smith2002.html> (vis-
ited Nov 30, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. See also Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings Of
Fact And Conclusions Of Law, Smith v University of Washington School of Law (Proposed
Findings of Fact IT 107, 117).
'o See Dershowitz and Hanft, 1 Cardozo L Rev at 416 n 114 (cited in note 5) ("In this
important respect, the admissions program at Harvard is ultimately less fair than the
program at Davis.... Under the Harvard program, the applicant's race alone 'may tip the
balance' in his favor, even if he is the scion of a wealthy and powerful family who attended
the best schools and has not been substantially scarred or disabled by the trauma of racial
discrimination"); Issacharoff, 59 Ohio St L J at 681 (cited in note 5) (noting the "apparent
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IV. RCDM LITIGATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion has skewed the litigation sur-
rounding RCDM in admissions in higher education and created
all sorts of litigation problems for those defending RCDM. In this
section, I explore a few of these phenomena.
The first problem is that the Court has said that the "compel-
ling interest" identified when defending RCDM must be the "real"
motivation.7' This presents a problem since many candid admis-
sions officials would admit that Justice Powell's vision of diver-
sity is not the motivation for their admissions programs and/or is
not particularly important.72 Indeed, the origins of such programs
mismatch between those individuals who have borne the brunt of inadequate educational
opportunity in the past and the likely beneficiaries of such programs in the present.
Whereas the former are likely to be poor, undereducated, and ill-prepared for the rigors of
elite higher educational institutions, the latter are quite likely to be the children of the
middle-class whose families have benefited from the fruits of the civil rights revolution").
But see Bakke, 438 US at 379 (Brennan concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (asserting that Harvard admissions program "ensure[s] that some of the scarce
places in institutions of higher education are allocation to disadvantaged minority stu-
dents") (emphasis added). It is unclear what basis Justice Brennan had for this descrip-
tion, which at least suggests that Harvard did not provide any advantages to minorities
from middle-class backgrounds.
71 United States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 533 (1996) (holding that gender classification
"must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation"); id at
535-36 ("[A] tenable justification must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations
for actions in fact differently grounded."); Shaw v Hunt, 517 US at 908 n 4 (1996) (stating
that "[tlo be a compelling interest, the State must show that the alleged objective was the
legislature's 'actual purpose' for the discriminatory classification" and rejecting remedial
purpose for discrimination because it "did not actually precipitate the use of race in the
redistricting plan"); Mississippi University for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 730 n 16
(1982) (rejecting gender-based discrimination allegedly designed to remedy past discrimi-
nation against women because "the State has failed to establish that the legislature in-
tended the single-sex policy to compensate for any perceived discrimination"); Contractors
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc v City of Philadelphia, 91 F3d 586, 597 (3d Cir
1996) (in action challenging city ordinance creating subcontracting set asides, holding that
"[tihe party challenging the race-based preferences can succeed by showing ... that the
subjective intent of the legislative body was not to remedy race discrimination in which
the municipality played a role").
71 See, for example, Schuck, 20 Yale L & Pol Rev at 34 (cited in note 12) ("many of
affirmative action's more forthright defenders readily concede that diversity is merely the
current rational of convenience for a policy that they prefer to justify on other grounds");
id at 28 ("even today when defenders of affirmative action use diversity rhetoric in order to
avoid legal pitfalls, the heart of the case for affirmative action is unquestionably its capac-
ity to remedy the current effects of past discrimination"); Jed Rudenfeld, Affirmative Ac-
tion, 107 Yale L J 427, 471 (1997) ("Everyone knows that in most cases a true diversity of
perspectives and backgrounds is not really being pursued. (Why no preferences for funda-
mentalist Christians or for neo-Nazis?)"); Kent Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of
Reverse Discrimination, 67 Cal L Rev 87, 122 (1979) ("I have yet to find a professional
academic who believes the primary motivation for preferential admission has been to
promote diversity in the student body for the better education of all the students.");
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seem to have little connection with "diversity" as a concept.1 It
also presents an opportunity for opponents of RCDM; it usually
would not be too difficult to find some statement somewhere sug-
gesting that Powell-type diversity was not the goal of the pro-
74gram.
The second major problem is raised by the "academic free-
dom" rationale, which, as already suggested, would permit (were
it taken seriously) the negative consideration of race as well as its
positive consideration.75 The litigation answer to this problem is
primarily to ignore "academic freedom" and focus on diversity.
Gabriel Chin, Bakke To the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 Wm & Mary Bill of
Rights J 881, 903 (1996) (suggesting that goal of ABA standards used to accredit law
schools is simply to increase minority representation); id at 909 (noting that some schools'
policies are racially selective, which is inconsistent with Bakkean diversity); Issacharoff,
59 Ohio St L J at 679 (cited in note 5) (noting that most minority admissions are not be-
cause of "diversity" but simply an attempt to attain more minority candidates); Issa-
charoff, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 18 (cited in note 21) ("I have never heard the term seriously
engaged on behalf of a Republican, a fundamentalist Christian, or a Muslim."); Dershowitz
and Hanft, 1 Cardozo L Rev at 383 n 14 (cited in note 5) ("[A]lthough every admission
office in the country will now paraphrase and purport to follow the Bakke mandate, most
admissions decisions will continue to be made on the basis of the same limited spectrum of
factors that have informed them in the past."); id at 407 ('rhe raison d'etre for race-
specific affirmative action programs has simply never been diversity for the sake of educa-
tion. The checkered history of 'diversity' demonstrates that it was designed largely as a
cover to achieve other legally, morally, and politically controversial goals. In recent years,
it has been invoked-especially by professional schools-as a clever post facto justifica-
tion for increasing the number of minority group students in the student body."). But see
id at 404 n 18 (some admissions officers have come to believe in the value of diversity).
" Professor Issacharoff points out that Derek Bok, a leading proponent of RCDM in
admissions, had taken a different position with respect to faculty hiring. Issacharoff, 2002
U Chi Legal F at 21-22 (cited in note 21); see also Silberman, The Origin of Affirmative
Action at 11-12 (cited in note 16) (relating meeting arranged by Derek Bok, and which
included William Bowen and others, in which the Nixon administration's focus on faculty
minority hiring goals was "causing academic dyspepsia" because it was "insensitive to
academic standards").
14 See, for example, Smith v University of Washington Law School, 2 F Supp 2d 1324,
1330, 1335 (W D Wash 1998) (noting that admissions policy asserted that one of the Law
School's goals was to "contribute to the diversity of... the legally trained segment of the
population"); Davis v Halpern, 768 F Supp 968, 980 (E D NY 1991) (denying summary
judgment where law school's affirmative action policy states that one of its goals was a
more "diversified" and "representative" bar).
'5 See notes 35-49 and accompanying text. See Dershowitz and Hanft, 1 Cardozo L
Rev at 407 (cited in note 5) (giving universities carte blanche discretion to determine the
amount of diversity that would be appropriate "could even allow a university to weigh an
applicant's race or religion negatively-as Harvard did [earlier in the 20th century] -in
order to enhance diversity in the face of an overabundance of applicants from a particular
racial or religious group"). As Dershowitz and Hanft correctly assert, though, there really
is no difference in effect between considering the race of some individuals positively and
considering the remaining individuals' race negatively. Id at 408 ("Mr. Justice Powell
allows a candidate's race to be given positive weight-thereby, in practice, allowing other
candidates' race to given negative weight.").
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More specifically, defenders of RCDM now place great weight on
evidence that purports to support the value of diversity in educa-
tion. 6 This evidence does not really address the fact that, however
valuable diversity may or may not be, many institutions have
done just fine without a tremendous amount of racial diversity.
77
And, of course, its mere presentation is inconsistent with the no-
tion that pursuing diversity is simply a matter of academic free-
dom. Academic freedom permits colleges, universities, and pro-
fessors the freedom to pursue ideas regardless of what evidence
there may be to support them; it protects unpopular and highly
disputed ideas, and those with no studies to support them, as
76 This evidence is both objective and subjective. That is, defenders of RCDM will
have teachers testify concerning their experiences about diversity and its value. See, for
example, Wessmann v Gittens, 160 F3d 790, 797 (1st Cir 1998); Grutter v Bollinger, 137 F
Supp 2d 821, 835 (E D Mich 2000); Johnson v Board of Regents of the University of Geor-
gia, 106 F Supp 2d 1362, 1371-72 (S D Ga 2000), affd, 263 F3d 1234 (11th Cir 2001). They
also have sponsored a study to measure in quantitative or scientific terms the value of
diversity. Grutter v Bollinger, 288 F3d 732, 759-63 (6th Cir 2002) (Clay concurring) (de-
scribing the leading study supporting the benefits of diversity, by Professor Patricia Gurin
of the University of Michigan); Gratz v Bollinger, 122 F Supp 2d 811, 822-23 (E D Mich
2000). See Patricia Gurin, Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, 5 Mich J Race & L 363 (1999),
available online at <http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/expert/gurintoc.html>
(visited Oct 17, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. Various criticisms and defenses of
Gurin's methodology can be found on the Internet and elsewhere. See Thomas E. Wood
and Malcolm J. Sherman, Race and Higher Education: Why Justice Powell's Diversity
Rationale for Racial Preferences In Higher Education Must Be Rejected 78-110 (National
Association of Scholars 2001), available online at <http://www.nas.org/rhe.pdf> (visited
Oct 17, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F]; Thomas E. Wood and Malcolm J. Sherman, Is
Campus Racial Diversity Associated With Educational Benefits (National Association of
Scholars 2001), available online at <httpJ/www.adversity.netDownloadslCASPart_
IV.pdf> (visited Oct 17, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F]; Robert Lerner and Althea K
Nagai, A Critique of the Expert Report Of Patricia Gurin In Gratz v. Bollinger, available
online at <http://www.ceousa.org/Gurinl.pdf> (visited October 17, 2002) [on file with U
Chi Legal F]; Patricia Gurin, Evidence For The Educational Benefits Of Diversity In
Higher Education: Response To The Critique By The National Association Of Scholars To
The Expert Report Of Patricia Gurin in Gratz et al v. Bollinger et al. and Grutter v.
Bollinger et al, available online at <http://www.umich.edu/-ureladmissions/new/ gurin.
html> (visited Oct 17, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F]; Brief of Stanford Institute for
Higher Education, as Amicus Curiae, Gratz v Bollinger, App Nos 01-1333, 01-1416 & 01-
1418, App (6th Cir filed June 12, 2001) (Ewart AC. Thomas and Richard J. Shavelson,
Analysis of Report of Wood & Sherman (June 12, 2001)); Thomas E. Wood and Malcolm J.
Sherman, Response to Patricia Y Gurin and to Ewart A.C. Thomas and Richard J.
Shavelson (National Association of Scholars 2001), available online at <httpJ/www.nas.org
freports/grutter-appeall/grutterappeall-appendix.pdf> (visited Oct 17, 2002) [on file
with U Chi Legal F]; Wendy M. Williams, Introduction: Perspectives on Intelligence Test-
ing, Affirmative Action and Educational Policy, 6 Psych Pub Pol and L 5, 10 (2000); G.E.
Zuriff, Is Racial and Ethnic Diversity Educationally Beneficial?, World and I 270-287
(Auqust 2002, Vol 17, No 8).
Dershowitz and Hanft, 1 Cardozo L Rev at 408 (cited in note 5) (listing Notre Dame
and Yeshiva University, among others).
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well as those in the mainstream." Moreover, by presenting evi-
dence supporting the value of diversity, defenders of RCDM sug-
gest that it is a question of fact rather than a question of law, and
that its value must be proven in each instance. Defendants in the
University of Michigan cases have certainly accumulated evi-
dence in an effort to factually support the educational benefits of
diversity, but what happens in a future case if the defendants do
not accumulate such evidence?
A third litigation problem from Justice Powell's opinion is its
assumption that racial diversity will lead to intellectual diversity,
and the unstated stereotyping corollary that people of a particu-
lar race have a particular perspective. Defenders of RCDM have
rejected the proposition that such a stereotype could be true,
while maintaining the more defensible position that race has a
significant influence on perspective. 9 They also have asserted
that diverse viewpoints within a given race provides significant
benefits because students learn of this intraracial diversity.so But
this argument seems to treat college and graduate students as if
they were ignoramuses, unaware of the fact that not all African
Americans (or Hispanics or Asian Americans, etc.) think alike.8'
Even if such ignoramuses were being admitted in droves to the
elite schools of our nation, one would think that the lesson of in-
trarace heterogeneity could be taught in many other ways (like,
for example, having students read the decisions of Justice Mar-
78 Thus, Justice Powell never referred to any evidence in support of the contention
that diversity has educational benefits. Indeed, he never explicitly said that it did have
such benefits. Bakke, 438 US at 312 (Powell) (an atmosphere of speculation, experiment,
and creativity is "widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body") (emphasis
added); id at 313 ("our tradition and experience lend support to the view that the contribu-
tion of diversity is substantial") (emphasis added).
79 See Chi Steve Kwok, A Study in Contradiction: A Look at the Conflicting Assump-
tions Underlying Standard Arguments for Speech Codes and the Diversity Rationale, 4 U
Pa J Const L 493, 502 (2002) (noting that educators reject the notion that there is an
"Asian viewpoint" or a "black viewpoint" but "recognizeD that race, given its present sali-
ence, may affect-but by no means determines-how one views the world"); Zuriff, World
and I at 270 (cited in note 76) (University of Michigan had "to chart a narrow course be-
tween the Scylla of stereotyping and the Charybdis of admitting that minority students do
not, as a group, contribute novel perspectives").
80 See, for example, Proof Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 32, Grutter, available on-
line at <http://www.umich.edu/~urel/admissions/legal/grutter/grutter-appeal.html> (vis-
ited Oct 17, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F] ("[L]earning also occurs when a minority
student does not express a view that might be expected, when students see that members
of one racial or ethnic group often have differing views, or when they discover that indi-
viduals of different racial groups may have similar attitudes on an issue.").
81 Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U Pa J Const L 573, 577 (2000).
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shall and Justice Thomas). And if it cannot be taught that simply,
then it probably cannot be taught at all.
Supporters of RCDM must also deal with the holding of
Bakke: that a set-aside of seats, where members of a particular
race cannot compete for the seats, is illegal under Title VI. Hav-
ing a literal set-aside is usually fairly easy to avoid." But most
institutions will have some objective for the matriculation of mi-
nority students, usually stated in terms of "critical mass."' At
this point, the line between a "critical mass" (which sounds a lot
like a minimum) and a set-aside begins to blur.
Finally, Justice Powell's opinion forces universities to explain
which groups they have included and/or excluded. Some schools
will not include all minority racial groups because, for example,
Asian Americans do not require a preference to be admitted in
reasonable numbers. It is unclear to date whether "admitted in
reasonable numbers without a preference" will sustain a racially
selective admissions program, and, even if it does, a clever plain-
tiff will be able to find some racial group that is not present in
significant numbers.' Other programs do include preferences for
Asian Americans, but do not include a preference for other diver-
sifying characteristics like sexual orientation on the ground that
homosexuals are admitted in reasonable numbers without a "di-
versity" preference. 8' It seems safe to say that the question of
which groups to include has not yet been completely resolved.
Both sides of the RCDM debate have a problem explaining
their choices for compelling interests in a coherent way. Support-
82 But see Gratz, 122 F Supp 2d at 831-32 (use of "protected seats" for a racial minor-
ity was tantamount to a set-aside and illegal under Bakke).
See, for example, Grutter, 288 F3d at 747.
The Sixth Circuit in Grutter approved the limit to "underrepresented" minority
groups, and brushed aside problems with their selection by deferring to the school's judg-
ment. 288 F3d at 751.
' The University of Washington School of Law had such a system prior to the pas-
sage of 1-200. Smith v University of Washington Law School, 233 F3d 1188, 1192 & nn 4-6
(9th Cir 2000) (discussing effects of 1-200 on challenge by Caucasian applicants to Univer-
sity of Washington's "diversity" policy). In that case, I argued that defendants' admissions
system was not narrowly tailored because it gave preferences to a group (Asians) that did
not need it. The judge characterized the argument that there should be a limit to when a
preference is provided as akin to asking for a "quota" with respect to Asians, and rejected
it. Smith v University of Washington School of Law, Slip Op Civ No 97-335Z, 28 (Finding
of Fact # 92) (W D Wash June 5, 2002), available online at <http://lib.law.washington.
edulresearch/smith2002.html> (visited Nov 30, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. See also
Posner, 67 Cal L Rev at 183 (cited in note 15) (noting that Asian Americans were present
at the Davis Medical School well in excess of their representation in the population of the
State of California and speculating that their inclusion in the special admissions program
was a consequence of the group's political power).
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ers of RCDM must explain why education is so different from
criminal law that we are willing to tolerate RCDM in the former,
but not in juries (assuming they do not wish to advocate RCDM
in jury selection, which most do not).' Conversely, those who at-
tack RCDM must explain why "remedying identified past dis-
crimination" is the only compelling interest (or, for that matter, a
compelling interest at all). RCDM, after all, means providing
preferences to those who are not necessarily victims of that past
discrimination.8 Why precisely should non-victims receive a pref-
erence, and if they should, then why is better education (or juries
or child rearing) not just as important a reason as making sure
that a given state body has the same racial make-up it hypotheti-
cally would have had in the absence of discrimination?"
Opponents of RCDM have two other problems they must face,
albeit ones not directly related to Bakke. The first is responding
to the defenders' argument that maintaining high academic stan-
dards along with the elimination of RCDM will reduce dramati-
cally the number of African Americans and other minorities at-
tending elite institutions. 9 Ironically, those attacking RCDM will
frequently point out that universities are not obligated to main-
tain their emphasis on grades and standardized test scores, and
would be able to attain more diversity if they emphasized those
'6 See text accompanying notes 47-50.
87 This, of course, is what makes it controversial. See Roger Pilon, Discrimination,
Affirmative Action, and Freedom: Sorting Out The Issues 45 Am U L Rev 775, 789 (1986)
(to the extent it benefits non-victims, RCDM is "[a] form of justice that operates only by
creating new victims-only through injustice-[and] can hardly claim the name justice").
'8 Justice Scalia appears to reject "remedying past discrimination" as a compelling
governmental interest:
In my view, however, the reason that [governmental action tailored to
remedy the detriment to specific construction companies victimized by
identified discrimination] would make a difference is not, as the Court
states, that it would justify race-conscious action ... but rather that it
would enable race- neutral remediation. Nothing prevents Richmond from
according a contracting preference to identified victims of discrimination.
While most of the beneficiaries might be black, neither the beneficiaries
nor those disadvantaged by the preference would be identified on the ba-
sis of their race.
City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co, 488 US 469, 526 (1989) (Scalia concurring). See also
Adarand Constructors v Pena, 515 US 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia concurring).
89 William G. Bowen and Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Conse-
quences of Considering Race in College and University Admissions 288 (Princeton 2000)
(asserting that universities will lower their standards in order to avoid large drop in the
number of black matriculants); Isaacharoff, 59 Ohio St L J at 685-86 (cited in note 5)
(asserting that elite public institutions would have to set standards far below ones to
admit significant numbers of minorities in a race-neutral way).
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criteria less.4 While this is true, it usually is the case that those
attacking RCDM have no great predeliction for lowering stan-
dards.
The lowering of standards raises yet another problem: the
"race-neutral" alternative. The Supreme Court has occasionally
asserted in other contexts that narrow tailoring requires that the
state actor consider "race-neutral alternatives. '9  But a "race-
neutral alternative"-for example, creating a minimum academic
standard and choosing students based upon their non-racial di-
versity characteristics-may be just as bad as racial preferences
if the purpose behind the standard lowering is simply to increase
the percentage of minorities at the institution.9 Indeed, it may be
worse since it simply tries to achieve the same goal in an ineffi-
cient way and indirect way.93 In a sense, the "race-neutral alter-
native" argument echoes the worst parts of Justice Powell's opin-
ion-that using race in a surreptitious way is better than using it
in an overt and candid way.'
'0 Grutter, 137 F Supp 2d at 852-53.
9' Croson, 488 US at 507.
92 Bowen and Bok, The Shape of the River at 287-88 (cited in note 86) (stating that
race neutral programs like Texas's program to admit automatically the top 10 percent of
all high school classes in the state to the state's universities "may be entirely worthwhile,
but it requires some ingenuity to conclude that they do not represent a form of 'racial
preference'); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action
and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 Baylor L Rev 289 (2001) (arguing that the Texas plan
should be subject to strict scrutiny and fails it).
93 Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L Rev 1781 (1996). As Professor Ayres
points out, if the goal is increasing the number of minorities in a profession or a school, it
is hard to understand why the narrowly-tailored method of achieving that goal is not a
direct racial preference. The question of whether RCDM should be employed to achieve
"diversity" is really a question about whether "racial diversity" is so important a compo-
nent of overall diversity that there must be a specific goal for representation of certain
minorities.
In this view, a requirement of considering a race-neutral alternative may be seen as
an effort to require state decision-makers to reconsider the goal of having a particular
proportion of racial minorities. That is, perhaps upon considering a preference for the
socio-economically disadvantaged as a substitute for a racial preference, the state-decision
maker will conclude that the initial racial goal was misguided.
9 See Schuck, 20 Yale L & Pol Rev at 74 (cited in note 12) (race-neutral "percent
plans ... may simply preserve the same objectionable use of ethno-racial preferences by
disguising them and effectuating them indirectly"). See also Issacharoff, 59 Ohio State L J
at 671 (cited in note 5) (noting the role of Bakke "in removing from the public eye the ac-
tual mechanisms by which a mild form of purposeful integration of higher education could
proceed"); id at 690 ("(Tlhe higher-education community and some judicial opinions inter-
preted Justice Powell's test to make constitutionality depend upon procedural mechanisms
that conceal the actual workings of the affirmative action plan.").
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V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ADOPTING THE
"DIVERSITY" RATIONALE
The Powell diversity paradigm has had significant negative
effects. Its lack of clarity about means has led colleges and uni-
versities to use race in extraordinary ways. Its rejection of in-
creasing minority presence in the medical field as a goal and its
focus on diversity has led university officials to deny or hide what
they are really trying to do-which, in the end, is simply putting
more minorities into the professions and the middle class. Most
importantly, it has eliminated the fundamental moral basis for
RCDM, and replaced it with a utilitarian model in which minor-
ity students are simply used as pawns to better the educational
experience for others. 5 The increasing unpopularity of RCDM has
followed. People can understand the moral argument, whether
they agree or disagree with it. I tend to think that many fewer
understand the utilitarian argument.'
The rule against race discrimination was never really a utili-
tarian-based rule.97 As Professor Epstein has demonstrated, dis-
crimination can frequently be rational, particularly where peo-
ple's utility functions have a significant element of prejudice or a
fear of those different." Despite that, we have reached a funda-
mental moral consensus in this country-perhaps because our
95 I realize that, as a simple working litigator, I am simply way out of my league in
tossing around words like "moral" and "utilitarian." I use them here not in any technical,
philosophical sense, but as they are used in common parlance. For those who insist upon a
more rigorous dichotomy, I am trying to use "moral" in some sort of Kantian or deontologi-
cal sense, where moral conduct is not derived from a measure of total human happiness,
but through some system of obligation or duty derived from the nature of human beings.
See, for example, George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function Of Criminal Theory, 88
Cal L Rev 687, 697 (2000) (noting that deontological and utilitarian approaches to moral
issues might yield different answers in criminal law); Julius Cohen, Critiquing the Legal
Order in the Name of "Critical Morality," 16 Cardozo L Rev 1599 (1995) (distinguishing
Kantians from utilitarians, the former reflecting an "autonomous" school of philosophy
centered on the notion of duty or obligation).
Professor Schuck refers to it as a "functional" argument. 20 Yale L & Pol Rev at 34
(cited in note 12). Dean Kronman calls the utilitarian argument an "internal" one, in con-
trast to the "external" goal of redistributing wealth in society for some purpose not rele-
vant to the education of students. 52 Fla L Rev at 865-866 (cited in note 21).
97 See Richard A. Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup Ct Rev 1, 24 (1974) ("The antidiscrimination
principle is not only more objective, but more compelling, when it is divorced from empiri-
cal inquiries into the effects of particular forms of discrimination on the affected groups.").
98 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employ-
ment Discrimination Laws (Harvard 1992). See also Volokh, 43 UCLA L Rev at 2061-62
(cited in note 52) (noting that homogeneity can be thought to have positive effects on
teamwork and efficiency).
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history has taught us that we cannot be trusted with making ad
hoc utilitarian decisions about the propriety of discrimination in
specific instances-that RCDM is wrong. In contrast, Justice
Powell's Bakke opinion states that ad hoc decisions are proper, so
long as they are made by our educated elite. This will not do. To
convince the public that there should be exceptions to that gen-
eral moral rule of non-discrimination, a moral claim of competing
weight must be offered. There may be such claims out there, but
they are not in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion.

